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Abstract: In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model 
for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, 
Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez 
(2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing 
loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro-
duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top-
down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the 
‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (de Vignemont, Ehrsson and 
Haggard, 2005). It then argues that the bottom-up, ascending 
direction is also necessary, and substantiates this view with recent 
research on skin space and tactile field (Haggard et al., 2017). 
Section 3 discusses the model’s application to body ownership and 
bodily self-representation. Implications also extend to topics such as 
sense modality individuation (Macpherson, 2011), the constancy-
based view of perception (Burge, 2010), and the perception/cognition 
divide (Firestone and Scholl, 2016). 
Keywords: bodily spatial phenomenology; recurrent model; skin 
space; tactile field; bodily self-representation. 
1. State of Play 
One crucial aspect of bodily phenomenology is its spatiality: bodily 
experiences include bodily sensations, thermal sensations, nociception 
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such as pains, and they all exhibit distinct spatial characters. How 
should bodily phenomenology in general be modelled? In Longo, 
Azañón and Haggard (2010), a purely bottom-up approach has been 
proposed. In this paper we explore its strengths and limits, and seek to 
provide a more plausible model. To anticipate, this new model 
acknowledges the bottom-up direction identified by Longo and 
colleagues, while supplementing it with a distinct account of the 
somatosensation level based on skin space and tactile field. Also, the 
new model adds the top-down direction based on the ‘body-based 
tactile rescaling’ paradigm. This new model is therefore a recurrent 
one, constituted by two distinct mechanisms. 
Matthew Longo and his colleagues (Longo, Azañón and Haggard, 
2010) have proposed this following way of conceptualizing the 
hierarchy of the somatosensory system: 
 
Figure 1. A hierarchical model of three levels of somatosensory content. 
Adapted from Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010). 
Somatosensation refers to sensory experiences generated by stimula-
tion of bodily receptors; they are what philosophers call ‘sensations’, 
such as tickles and pains. In this paper we focus on neutral sensations, 
i.e. not painful, and not too hot or cold. Cases such as pains have 
different spatial characteristics that we do not aim to cover here. 
Somatoperception refers to using somatosensory inputs to perceive 
specific objects — in the case of touch, the acknowledged intero-
ceptive/exteroceptive duality of touch (Katz, 1925/1989), which 
means that the content of somatoperception is both a stimulus object 
and the body itself. In philosophers’ terms, they are sensory experi-
ences that are purported to be about external objects. Somatorepre-
sentation refers to the representation of one’s own body specifically, 
both as a volumetric physical object and as the site or owner of lower-
level somatosensory experience. In Longo et al.’s original model, 
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these levels are perceived as hierarchically ascending only (note the 
arrow directions in Figure 1; the arrows indicate the direction of 
information processing. The idea is that we receive pieces of informa-
tion from the external world, which generate sensations first, and with 
further processing we then perceive both the external world and our 
own bodies. But we want to suggest that there should be a recurrent, 
descending arrow from the somatorepresentational to either the 
somatoperceptual or somatosensory level, depending on which kind of 
spatial experience is being discussed. This means that both sensation 
and perception in touch can exemplify cognitive penetration from the 
top down. In Section 2, we first explain how the descending arrow can 
be tested empirically, and then substantiate the ascending arrow by 
introducing a crucial notion of ‘skin space’ (defined in Figure 4). A 
recurrent model with both the ascending and the descending arrows is 
thus proposed. In Section 3, we explain how this model can help 
understand body ownership and bodily self-representation. 
A few remarks on our methodology: we believe that the issues 
tackled here are at the same time empirical in nature and with pro-
found philosophical implications. In order to be focused, however, we 
put the discussions of the latter in the second half and also in various 
footnotes to make sure the gist of the main text is easy to grasp. But 
this style does not imply that those rather philosophical discussions 
are unimportant. We believe that the boundary between science and 
philosophy in this context is blurry anyway, but for practical purposes 
we have decided to emphasize the empirical thread in the first half of 
the main text. 
Why are materials in this paper specifically about skin space as a 
mosaic of sensitive receptors, relevant to bodily spatial phenomenol-
ogy? Bodily experiences typically exemplify spatial characteristics: 
tactile sensations tend to have some rough locations, and one can feel 
one sensation as beside another one, for example. These examples of 
bodily spatial phenomenology are normally explained by notions of 
body images and schemas (Gallagher, 2005). Apart from the diffi-
culties of reaching the consensus about the definitions of those notions 
(de Vignemont, 2016), it is striking that the role of skin is largely 
ignored; it is not covered by body images or schemas at all. In what 
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follows, one half of the recurrent model — the ascending side — will 
crucially rely on the spatial properties of the skin.1 
2. The Recurrent Model Vindicated 
Here we first explain why the descending arrow has to be postulated. 
In the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (e.g. de Vignemont, 
Ehrsson and Haggard, 2005), a participant is asked to hold their left 
index finger tip, while tendon vibration is applied to the right biceps 
tendon. The tendon vibration causes the somatosensation that the right 
arm is extending. This in turn produces a change in the representation 
of the left index finger, as longer than it really is. When participants 
are then asked to judge the distance between two touches on the index 
finger (which we consider a somatoperceptual task), they perceive this 
tactile distance as longer than in a control condition where the tendon 
is not vibrated. This finding deserves several comments. Firstly, 
somatosensory inputs drive representations of the body as a physical 
object, confirming the ascending hierarchy of Figure 1. Secondly, and 
crucially, the representation thus generated influences the percept 
caused by other somatosensory stimulations, such as the distance 
between the two touches, and exemplifies the descending arrow. 
These data show that the representational level can influence bodily 
spatial experience. Notice that the extension of the right forearm 
causes a representation of the left index finger as lengthening only 
because the left and right fingertips are moved to the same external 
spatial location, and are in contact. Figure 2 shows how the experi-
ment works, and Figure 3 shows how we should think about this 
experiment through the two-mechanism recurrent model. 
Now, in the literature the ascending arrow is in general accepted, 
but exactly how it works behaviourally and how it is realized physiol-
ogically are still open questions. In what follows we propose a specific 
way of understanding this ascending direction and the inputs for it. 
                                                          
1  A recent work by Clare Mac Cumhaill (2017) argues that the figure–ground structure 
can also realize in touch. While illuminating and congenial to our proposal below on 
skin space and tactile field, that work also does not discuss the relevant contributions of 
skin (though the term does appear in various places). 
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Figure 2. A proprioceptive illusion of right arm extension, generated by 
vibrating the bicep tendon, leads to the perception of the left finger being 
lengthened, but only if the right hand grasps the left finger. This in turn 
leads to two touches on the left finger being judged as more distant from 
each other, relative to two touches on the forehead, than in a condition 
where no tendon vibration is applied. Adapted from de Vignemont, Ehrsson 
and Haggard (2005). 
 
Figure 3. ‘Left finger size extension’ (somatorepresentation) and ‘two 
localised touches’ (somatosensation) jointly induce ‘tactile distance over-
estimation’ (somatoperception). We thank Lynn Chiu for making this figure. 
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There is no physiological receptor that tells us how big our body parts 
are. Somatosensory inputs by themselves say nothing directly about it 
(Roberts, 2002, especially chapter 18 and 19). Size information is not 
something that can be directly read out from afferent inputs. What we 
have are indirect feedbacks from sight, haptic exploration of our own 
bodies, and so on. What this means is that one has to ask this question: 
where is this kind of geometric-morphological information and where 
does it come from? How do you know the parameters at the somato-
representational level? This is where the ascending arrow comes in: 
what is distinctive about bodily awareness is that it is at least partially 
relying on bodily signals at the somatosensation level. 
An interesting follow-up question is this: do the receptors in the skin 
itself provide enough spatial organization to account for bodily spatial 
phenomenology, as introduced in Section 1? Our answer is positive. 
The skin contains several classes of receptor cells that respond to 
different forms of touch, such as vibration, light-touch, and sustained 
pressure (Gallace and Spence, 2014, chapter 2). Importantly, these 
receptors are systematically, though disproportionately, distributed 
across the body surface, rather like a receptor mosaic. This distribu-
tion explains both the familiar Penfield homunculus (Penfield and 
Rasmussen, 1950) and the columnar organization of the somato-
sensory cortex (V.B. Mountcastle, 1997). The somatotopic maps in 
the brain show that receptors responsive to adjacent regions of skin 
project to adjacent sites in the cortex. Thus, the cortex respects the 
receptive field organization of the skin. In typical everyday activities, 
skin receptors with a particular spatial arrangement will show reliable 
patterns of activation. For example, a leaf brushing against my face as 
I walk under a tree will trace a path across a succession of receptive 
fields on my face (see Figure 4). The natural statistics of such stimuli 
means that skin space alone could be sufficient for spatial adjacency 
relations. For example, in the figure below, the same leaf might trace 
the paths A1 to A4 on one occasion, and A4 to D4 on another, 
depending on the direction that I am walking. In contrast, a sequence 
of stimulation A1–B3–C2–C3 might be less likely. The regularity of 
the A1–A4 and A4–D4 paths allows an implicit, non-conceptual 
spatial representation of S-space, based only on a relation of 
adjacency between receptive fields. A similar proposal for the sensory 
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origin of logical structure of space was made by Jean Nicod (1930).2 
Importantly, this kind of spatial organization is sufficient for the kind 
of spatial behaviour known as path integration. 
 
Figure 4. A simple model of skin space (S-space): the skin is covered by a 
mosaic of sensitive receptors, whose receptive fields are arranged like the 
cells of a spreadsheet, or the pixels of a screen. When an object touches 
the skin in the corresponding receptive field, a signal from the receptor is 
sent to the brain. When an object moves relative to the body, it traces a 
continuous path across adjacent receptive fields (solid grey arrows). The 
natural statistics of such paths allows the organism to build up, from many 
repeated experiences, a map of the organization of S-space, based only on 
relations of spatial adjacency. This map can in turn support an advanced 
level of geometric processing, such as the most direct path between two 
points via a novel route (dashed grey arrow). The idea of this diagram is 
from Fardo et al. (in preparation). 
Suppose that the leaf has brushed first A1–A4, and then A4–D4. 
Suppose that I wish, for some reason, to move the leaf, or move my 
body, so that the leaf returns to its original A1 location on the skin of 
my face. If the system has stored the adjacency relations between all 
the receptive fields, I do not need to retrace the leaf’s original paths. I 
can instead move so that the leaf goes directly back towards the A1 
                                                          
2  Nicod there invokes an interesting thought experiment that involves a creature moving 
back and forth on a keyboard that can make sounds. His main contention is that 
succession and resemblance are sufficient to construct spatial representation. It is 
interesting to compare this with Strawson’s sound-world (1959), with which space’s 
special status is revealed. Strawson (1959) argues that the sound-world cannot support 
the type of objective thought for which he thinks a conception of space is required. 
Evans (1985) suggests that this can be overcome by postulating a ‘travel-based con-
ception of space’ (p. 255). For more on this, see Haggard et al. (2017). 
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home position, via C3 and B2. Exactly the same process of movement 
tracking and path integration is thought to underlie the construction of 
an allocentric map of the environment by the place and grid cells of 
the rat hippocampus and entorhinal cortex (Bush, Barry and Burgess, 
2014; O’Keefe, 1994). We suggest that a similar 2D map of skin 
space, or S-space, could underlie the experienced spatiality of the 
body. Importantly, this process does not require a hierarchical pro-
gression from non-conceptual sensory to conceptual content, such as 
Figure 1. Rather, the spatial processing is a consequence of the field 
organization at the somatosensory level.3 Now, some might still 
wonder how somatosensation can play a key role in deriving geo-
metrical and morphological information about the body, given what 
we just said above. The answer is this: path integration has been taken 
as one hallmark of spatial representation, because the bias indicates 
that the system takes into account the spatial connections between the 
previous paths (Etienne and Jeffery, 2004). Now, it has been shown 
that path integration happens at the level of human skin too (Haggard 
et al., 2017). This is the key evidence for the ascending aspect of the 
recurrent model. Notice that we do not claim that the hypothesis here 
is necessitated by the finding; rather, it is proposed that this hypothesis 
has the strength of being explanatorily effective and simple. Neigh-
bour relations are sufficient for topological space, which is in turn 
sufficient for distance estimation. 
One natural way to understand S-space is to think of it as a tactile 
field, which is analogous to a visual field. The basic idea is that ‘the 
tactile field supports computation of spatial relations between indi-
vidual stimulus locations, and thus underlies tactile pattern per-
ception… Perception of spatial patterns across the field is linked to a 
structural representation of one’s own body’ (Haggard and 
Giovagnoli, 2011, pp. 65–6, our emphasis; for detailed description of 
how the tactile field underlies tactile pattern perception, see Haggard 
et al., 2017). ‘Tactile pattern judgements depend on secondary factors 
over and above local tactile perceptual ability at the stimulated loca-
tions’ (Haggard and Giovagnoli, 2011, p. 73).4 Tactile field in a 
                                                          
3  The discussion concerning the conceptual/non-conceptual divide is a thorny one that we 
wish to avoid on this occasion (Gunther, 2003). What we say here about skin space and 
tactile field are presumably non-conceptual. 
4  The discussion here is based on Haggard and Giovagnoli (2011). That paper involves a 
stronger assumption concerning the analogy with visual field as understood by Smythies 
(1996). The notion of visual field there is a sensationalist one, which postulates a 2D 
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significant sense sustains tactile object perception. Compare the noci-
ceptive sense, the thermal sense, and the tactile sense: while the noci-
ceptive sense is neither capable of being exteroceptive nor object-
directed, the thermal sense is capable of being exteroceptive but not 
object-directed, and the tactile sense is capable of being both extero-
ceptive and object-directed (Mancini et al., 2015; Marotta, Ferrè and 
Haggard, 2015). This is because estimating distances between stimuli 
on the skin requires computing the position of one stimulus relative to 
another. Both the nociceptive sense and the thermal sense represent 
relative position poorly, and notably worse than they represent abso-
lute position of a single stimulus. In contrast, the tactile sense supports 
representation of relative position fairly well, which justifies the 
postulation of a tactile field. 
Previous work on tactile fields and tactile distance perception did 
not clearly distinguish between two very different forms of bodily 
modulation of touch (e.g. Gallace and Spence, 2008). The first would 
be a descending modulation of somatoperception by somatorepre-
sentation. The tendon vibration effects on tactile distance, and the 
structural, joint-based modulations of tactile distance, strongly support 
this route. The second form of bodily modulation occurs at the level of 
S-space alone, based on acquisition of spatial-adjacency information 
from experience, and simple processes of path integration. This form 
of spatial organization could be sufficient to explain the experienced 
spatiality of the body. On this view, the tactile field itself may house 
some key features of bodily experience, as opposed to merely 
reflecting features of bodily experience generated at other levels of 
representation. To repeat, there may be two distinct mechanisms of 
body representation underlying the spatiality of bodily experience. 
One is the use of cognitive representations to modulate somato-
perceptions generated in S-space. The second is the capacity of S-
space to house non-cognitive representations of the body, at least in 
the 2D sense of the tactile field, and sometimes to contribute to 
somatoperception and somatorepresentation. Clearly, and importantly, 
this latter mechanism lacks the third dimension of space, but it does 
involve an important and powerful form of spatial processing. An 
important point for future research will be to investigate the respective 
                                                                                                                  
sensational mosaic for vision. This idea can be traced back to Bishop Berkeley’s works, 
and one famous contemporary version is Peacocke (1983). This additional view is not 
assumed on this occasion. Perhaps the materials provided above can be resources to 
argue for sensationalism for touch, but here we do not pursue this line. 
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contributions of these two mechanisms for the spatiality of bodily 
experience. 
Here are more details about S-space and the tactile field. The tactile 
field has axes, and it is capable of misrepresentation, for example the 
estimation of distances between multiple stimuli can be biased for all 
sorts of reasons (e.g. Fardo et al., in preparation, on the path integra-
tion bias similar to animal navigation). Its organization is based on 
receptors, as opposed to joints. It is organized as a continuous sheet, 
as opposed to structured and segmented. Again more studies need to 
be done concerning this level of bodily spatial phenomenology, but 
we believe to have shown that skin space is crucial in capturing some 
aspects of it. It provides information for further processing at the 
somatoperceptual and somatorepresentational levels, but we have also 
seen that the other direction exists as well, as shown by the body-
based tactile rescaling paradigm. Both the ascending and the descend-
ing directions are crucial in understanding bodily spatial phenomenol-
ogy, and thus the most plausible model should be a recurrent one. 
Neither purely a bottom-up nor purely top-down level alone is able to 
fully capture bodily spatial phenomenology. 
This tactile field theory has profound implications for many current 
issues in philosophy of perception and psychology. Here we discuss 
only three. First of all, it might provide a potential partial answer to 
sense modality individuation (Macpherson, 2011): if one sense is 
interoceptive only while the other is capable of being exteroceptive, 
then perhaps it is sensible to hold that they are distinct modalities. 
Similarly, if one sense is capable of being object-directed due to the 
tactile field while the other is not, then perhaps it is sensible to hold 
that they are also distinct modalities (Cheng, 2015). This view might 
compete with two other views: one argues that touch is a unified sense 
(Fulkerson, 2014), while the other argues that there will be no satis-
fying answer forthcoming (Ratcliffe, 2012). Secondly, this field-based 
view of tactile spatial perception might be an interesting contrast with, 
or perhaps a supplement to, the constancy-based view of object and 
objective perception (Smith, 2002; Burge, 2010): on varieties of that 
view, perceptual constancy is the basis of object perception. The field-
based view might help explain perceptual constancy in touch through 
S-space and the tactile field. Last but not least, the tactile field idea 
might also contribute to the debate concerning the division between 
perception and cognition. Traditionally, it has been thought that 
Fodorian modularity (Fodor, 1983) can secure such a division, but it 
has been challenged by recent works on cognitive penetration (for a 
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recent discussion, see Firestone and Scholl, 2016). Since the tactile 
field can host spatial perception in its own right without downstream 
cognition, it might offer further grounds for insisting on the per-
ception/cognition divide in the case of touch. Notice that the existence 
of cognitive, top-down penetration does not by itself challenge the 
idea that there is a distinctive perceptual level: actually it might even 
presuppose that there should be a perception/cognition divide, since A 
can penetrate B only if A and B are distinct in some significant sense. 
3. Body Ownership and 
Bodily Self-Representation 
Above we have attempted to model bodily spatial phenomenology, 
focusing on neutral touch. In this final section we discuss some 
implications of the model concerning body ownership and bodily self-
representation. First, what is body ownership? In the literature it 
roughly means that we have a sense of ownership over individual 
body parts and the body as a whole. This is to be contrasted with 
mental ownership, which concerns who the subject is (Lane, 2012). 
Why does the recurrent model have anything to do with body owner-
ship? In his chapter in The Subject’s Matter: Self-Consciousness and 
the Body, José Luis Bermúdez (2017) provides an explanation of body 
ownership. The hypothesis he defends is that judgments of body 
ownership are based on the experienced spatiality of the body. He then 
uses A-location (the location of a bodily event in a specific body part 
relative to an abstract map of the body, without taking into account the 
current position of the body) and B-location (the location of a bodily 
event in a specific body part relative to the current position of relevant 
body parts) to cash out the account.5 We are sympathetic to his view, 
but his model seems to cover the descending arrow only, as shown in 
his adaptation of the Marr and Nishihara’s (1978) model of object 
recognition. Our discussion of S-space can be seen as supplementing 
his model by providing the ascending model, and thereby has a fuller 
account of body ownership. 
What about bodily self-representation? In this context we mean by it 
one’s representation of one’s own body as a physical object. We argue 
that one form of exteroceptive perception — tactile perception — is 
crucial in understanding not only body ownership but also bodily self-
                                                          
5  See also Bermúdez (1998; 2005; 2011; 2015). 
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representation. ‘Perception of a tactile pattern based on the spatial 
relations between stimuli therefore involves at least a basic element of 
self-representation… Tactile pattern perception involves an important 
yet overlooked aspect of [bodily] self-representation’ (Haggard and 
Giovagnoli, 2011, p. 66, p. 73). The role of body representation in 
mediating tactile pattern perception offers a new insight into the 
classic problem of the relation between perception and bodily self-
representation (cf. Bermúdez, 1998; Campbell, 2012; Peacocke, 
2015): 
A substantive representation of one’s own body as a volumetric object 
mediates spatial judgements on the body surface covered by skin. 
Tactile pattern perception involves representing oneself both as a source 
of sensory experience, but also as a physical object with a characteristic 
body structure, and therefore having spatial attributes analogous to 
other objects. In touch, then, the linkage between primary experience 
and [bodily] self-consciousness seems stronger than in vision. The 
linkage shows that the body is a physical as well as a psychological 
object. In this sense, tactile pattern perception presupposes a self that is 
an object embedded in the world, rather than simply a viewpoint on the 
world. (Haggard and Giovagnoli, 2011, p. 74)6 
In the example of tendon vibrations given above, one invokes repre-
sentations of one’s own body to measure external objects, in order to 
make distance judgments. In this paper we have shown that the tactile 
field defined in S-space may also play a similar role, without any need 
of cognitive body representation. But, tactile signals in S-space could 
also contribute to body ownership and bodily self-representation, in 
much the same way as Bermúdez argues that body representations do. 
Without this supplement from S-space and the tactile field, 
Bermúdez’s picture risks overemphasizing the role of somatorepre-
sentation, and underemphasizing the role of somatosensory signals. 
Somatosensation may be a simpler, more grounded place to look for 
                                                          
6  In the Haggard-Giovagnoli paper, M.G.F. Martin’s view (1992; see also O’Shaugh-
nessy, 1989) is one of the critical targets, but the disagreement might actually be else-
where. In particular, it might be due to Martin’s (perhaps correct) insistence that the 
visual field should not be understood in sensationalist terms. Both Martin’s view and 
O’Shaughnessy’s view can be traced back to Strawson: ‘The case of touch is less 
obvious; it is not, e.g., clear what one would mean by a “tactual field”’ (1959, p. 65). 
The view presented here can be seen as an answer to Strawson’s question. This view on 
self-representation can find further support in Merleau-Ponty (1962/2013), McDowell 
(1996), Cassam (1997), and Gallace and Spence (2014), though the ways they argue for 
this kind of view are crucially different from the current discussion. 
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‘from-the-inside-ness’, since both body ownership and bodily self-
representation in the relevant sense are distinctively bodily in 
character. To be sure, we do not venture to propose that the tactile 
field is necessary or together with other elements jointly sufficient for 
body ownership and bodily self-representation. For example, patients 
with somatoparaphrenia still have the tactile field, but this does not 
guarantee the veridicality of the relevant bodily self-representation.7 
More generally, Bermúdez’s conditions might be met while body 
ownership can still be missing, i.e. his conditions can bring about the 
judgment ‘this body’, but perhaps not ‘my body’. Adding an additional 
condition of S-space might be helpful in this regard, but whether it is 
necessary or sufficient is another matter. We do not pretend that we 
have met the challenge of explaining body ownership and bodily self-
representation on this occasion. However, while many authors agree 
that body ownership and bodily self-representation are somehow 
related to body spatial phenomenology, very few authors consider the 
role of tactile spatial perception in this regard. Since this aspect of the 
body has so far been ignored by the literature, we believe it is 
beneficial to have it in view even if it does not ultimately answer the 
difficult questions of body ownership and bodily self-representation 
just by itself.8 
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